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Abstract
This work is part of a project which goal is to understand natural language by taking
dialogue as a primitive notion. For this aim, the core of our theoretical framework is a
logical theory of interaction, namely Ludics. Ludics is a logical theory developed by J.Y.
Girard as an achievement of both proof theoretical and computational theoretical consid-
erations. Above all it is a theory of interaction in the sense that interaction is ontologically
the primitive element of Ludics. Ludics being a logical theory, our framework is relevant
for grasping logical dimensions of language, especially for studying argumentation but also
divergences in dialogue as we show in this paper. In particular complementary aspects of
argumentation and divergence in dialogues are modelled in a uniform way: from logics and
pragmatics to semantics and syntax. Furthermore we account for several features of dia-
logues directly at the formal level. Therefore, we may expect a fine-grained representation
of various dialogical phenomenas. More precisely we illustrate this last point by describing
how different divergences in dialogue may be distinguished in our modelling.
1 Introduction
During these last decades, dialogue has become again the subject of intensive studies. This
is the case inside Logics. The relevance of the dialogical frame for Logics is well known since
Aristotle and it continues to be an important ingredient for logical studies [6, 3]. The study
of dialogues is also essential in argumentation theory, in which debates and controversies are
consubstantial to argumentation. The study of natural language makes also use of dialogical
situations for grasping various aspects of natural languages, semantical but also syntactical
ones [15, 1]. In this perspective, works of J. Ginzburg are noticeable as they consist in develop-
ing directly a Theory of Dialogue (KoS, [9]). Our aim is very close to his approach as we also
intend to define a theoretical framework able for studying linguistic phenomenas starting from
their manifestations in dialogues. Our proposal shares with KoS numerous methodological
postulates:
– Meaning should not be studied on decontextualized sentences, by adding phonetical and prag-
matical modules to syntactical and semantical ones. Instead, all features have to be grasped
together.
– For studying and describing a communication, it is relevant to take seriously into account its
successful transmission of contents as well as its failures (e.g., misunderstanding) and its repair
attempts.
– Dynamics of language cannot be ignored. The meaning of an utterance is elaborated in a
conversational process. The attempts for making explicit, for repairing, for updating parts of
meaning have an important role.
Nevertheless, our approach has to be distinguished from KoS with respect to the theoretical
∗This work has been partially funded by the French ANR projet blanc “Locativity and Interaction in Logic,
Linguistics and Computer Sciences” LOCI ANR-10-BLAN-0212 03.
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framework on which it relies. Indeed, we place ourselves in the perspective of recent philo-
sophical positions, as for example Pinker’s claim: “Dialogue is at the origin of language” [13],
or Brandom’s position with his inferentialist semantics based on asking and giving reasons [2].
According to these approaches, interaction is ontologically the primitive fact of language. This
is why we choose Ludics as our formal framework. Ludics is a logical theory developed by J.Y.
Girard [10] as an achievement of both proof theoretical and computational theoretical consid-
erations. Above all, it is a theory of interaction in the sense that interaction is ontologically
its primitive concept. Preliminary works have shown the interest of this logical framework for
the modelling of dialogues (e.g., [11, 12, 4]). Ludics being a logical theory, our framework is
relevant for grasping logical dimensions of language, especially for studying argumentation [7, 5]
but also divergences in dialogue as we show in this paper. In particular complementary aspects
of argumentation and divergence in dialogues are modelled in a uniform way: from logics and
pragmatics to semantics and syntax. Furthermore we account for several features of dialogues
directly at the formal level. Therefore, we may expect a fine-grained representation of various
dialogical phenomenas. More precisely we illustrate this last point by describing how different
divergences in dialogue may be distinguished in our modelling.
2 A Frame for a Dialogue Theory
2.1 A few Facts on the Theoretical Framework
Ludics is a theory of interaction: its main object is the interaction itself and its dynamics.
Designs are the support of interaction. Interaction between designs is allowed when these
designs are (at least partially) localized at the same address (i.e., a cut in terms of logics).
Such a situation triggers the dynamical process of interaction that abstracts the logical process
of cut-elimination. We refer the reader to [10] for a thorough presentation of Ludics, we just
sketch below elementary aspects.
The elementary step of an interaction is an action (a move in Game Semantics), which is
represented as a triple: (i) a polarity, that is positive (resp. negative) with respect to one of two
interacting designs, when the action is produced (resp. received) by this design; (ii) the current
address of the interactive process; (iii) a finite set of new addresses that the action creates
(positive polarity) or expects (negative polarity) and on which the interaction may continue.
In addition, there is a special positive action called daimon and denoted by z which enables to
terminate an interaction.
A base is a finite set of addresses that localizes the design: interaction may begin on such
addresses. Formally it is a sequent Γ ` ∆ where Γ contains at most one address, which is said
in negative position, and ∆ contains a finite set of addresses, said in positive position. A design
based on Γ ` ∆ is a set of coherent alternate sequences of actions starting on the address in Γ
if it exists, in ∆ otherwise.
An interaction between two designs occurs when their bases share an address in dual po-
sition. The process of interaction is a step by step travel through dual alternate sequences of
actions. This process may diverge if these two (dual) sequences yield actions which are not
dual each other, it may converge when one of these two (dual) sequences yields z, it may also
continue indefinitely.
Two modes of interaction are available: either a closed mode when the base contains only
addresses shared by the two designs, or an open mode. Interaction may then be interpreted in
two ways. The closed mode focuses on the process itself: it tests the possibility that interaction
may go on and converge (to daimon), without paying attention to any context. The open mode
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focuses on the transformation that this process induces on the context (i.e., the addresses that
are not shared by the interacting designs). In terms of Logics, the first case is similar to a
cut-elimination between dual formulas and it enables to decompose them with respect to their
structure, the second case corresponds to a modus ponens: from a proof of A and a proof
of A ⇒ B, we get a proof of B, where B is the context. In terms of natural language and
reasoning, the first case helps modelling interacting processes, e.g., dialogue processes, while
the second one may be used for modelling explicitation processes, e.g., calculi, deductions or
context updating.
2.2 A few Facts on the Model
Our model of dialogue is organized in two levels, that we may intuitively compare to the two
modes of interaction in Ludics. The first level deals with the surface of dialogues, i.e., the flow
of interventions and their role inside the process. At the second level, we take into account the
content of these interventions.
2.2.1 The surface of dialogues
With respect to the first level, that considers the dynamics of a dialogue, a dialogue is seen
only as an alternate sequence of interventions among which we may distinguish the one which
initiates the exchange and the one which eventually ends the exchange. Interventions are only
considered according to (i) their role in the flow of interventions: one intervention is anchored
on a previous one and opens possible continuations of the dialogue, (ii) the fact that they are
produced by one locutor while they are in the same time received by the other locutor.
We interpret interventions by means of dialogue acts. Formally, a dialogue act is an action of
Ludics anchored in an address L opening addresses {L1, . . . , Ln} together with the expression e
that reveals the dialogue act in the intervention: that is a quadruple (+/−, L, {L1, . . . , Ln}, e).
It is worth noticing that an address created by a dialogue act (with positive polarity) may
represent what Ginzburg and Fernandez call a question under discussion (QUD) [8]. The
dialogue act is the minimal unit of communication, whose role is to fuel the dynamics and
determine the shape of the dialogue. At this level, the dialogue is reduced to a process. A
dialogue act expresses an entitlement or a decision of the speaker, and also its acknowledgment
by the addressee. In some sense, it is quite close to a speech act. However, dialogue acts are more
elementary than speech acts. Let us consider, for example, the speech acts of argumentation,
as presented in [7]. While the fact to argue, to ask or to negate are accounted by a single
dialogue act, the concession is accounted by a sequence of two dialogue acts: the first one,
denoted κ is positive with respect to the locutor who makes the concession: κ enables to precise
which assertion is conceded, it is anchored on the pending address created by the assertion
which is conceded; moreover, κ creates a single new address L′ on which the next dialogue act
is anchored. The action with address L′ is then negative with respect to the same locutor.
This latter dialogue act creates no new addresses, therefore pending addresses relative to the
conceded utterance disappear and cannot be used in the following of the dialogue.
An intervention, or turn of speech, is a sequence of dialogue acts. From the viewpoint of the
locutor who produces it, the intervention begins and ends with a positive dialogue act. When
there is no divergence or rupture of the dialogue, the sequence of dual actions is recorded by the
locutor who receives the intervention. A turn of speech is then twofold: producing an utterance
to her interlocutor and expecting an utterance from her interlocutor.
A dialogue defines two sequences, called paths: each of them being the dialogue seen from
the viewpoint of one locutor. Finally each path defines a design, hence a dialogue may be
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considered as the trace of the interaction between two designs, one for each locutor.
This first level of modelling captures the surface of a dialogue. It is already enough to take
into account important aspects of dialogues, namely the pragmatical and rethorical ones [4].
More fundamentally, this level enables to pay attention to the notion of convergence/divergence
in the dialogue. Viewing the dialogue as a trace of an interaction between two designs makes
explicit the fact that there are two points of view. Therefore it allows to observe the success
or the failure of a communication between these two points of view, i.e., the fact that the
dialogue may fail or end with a drop. Dialogues may badly end because of misunderstandings,
disagreements, lacks of informations . . . and it is necessary to be able to represent such
situations. At each step in Ludics, an interaction may continue if a negative action exists in
one design that is dual to the positive action ‘played’ by the other design. Transposed in our
modelling, a dialogue may continue without divergence provided that the current intervention
produced by a locutor (a positive action) is correctly received/expected by her addressee (the
dual negative action exists).
Example 1. A person P conducting a survey gives to a native the following informations: “All
the Kpelle cultivate rice. Mister Smith does not cultivate rice”. The person P asks the following
question to the native N:
– P: “Is Mister Smith a Kpelle?”
– N: “I do not know Mister Smith, I have never seen him.”
At that level, we consider only the question and its answer that we represent each by a single
dialogue act:
• (+/−, L0, {L1}, Is Mister Smith a Kpelle?): positive for the person P that produces the question,
negative for the native N that may receive it.
• (+/−, L1, {L2}, I do not know...): positive for the native N that produces the answer, negative
for the person P that should expect it.
But the person P expects a logically correct answer, e.g., “no”, that we denote (+/−, L2, {L3}, No).
He plans also to receive an incorrect answer, e.g., “yes” or “it may be the case”, that we denote
(+/−, L2, {L4}, Yes).
` L3 ` L4
L1 `
` L0
The viewpoint of P
L2 `
` L1
L0 `
The viewpoint of N
The interaction between the two designs associated resp. to
the dialogue seen from the viewpoint of P and of N diverges:
the design corresponding to the viewpoint of P has no
negative action dual to (+, L1, {L2}, I don’t know...).
The dialogue cannot continue.
2.2.2 A full account of dialogues
We can refine this first approach in order to take care of other dimensions of dialogue, typically
phonetical, lexical, syntactical, semantical, pragmatical and dialectical ones. In particular, we
set a cognitive base for each locutor. A cognitive base contains, roughly speaking, the various
knowledges and abilities1 used for building utterances as well as for receiving and recording
them. Such a cognitive base is twofold: (1) sets of statements, that are assumed by each
locutor; (2) the linguistic elements used and received during the process of dialogue. While the
level of surface of dialogues makes only use of the closed mode of interaction, the management
of cognitive bases, their updating and their use in the dialogue in progress make use of the open
mode of interaction2.
1Once again, we intend to consider all different dimensions of language, hence knowledges and abilities
concern linguistic ones (phonetical, lexical, syntactical, semantical, pragmatical and dialectical ones) as well as
logical or psycho-social ones.
2We retrieve the logical dimension of a dialogue only at this level.
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Concretely, we make use of the following elements for modelling a dialogue between two
protagonists A and B:
– The dialogue is a sequence of triples3 (CiA, C
i
B , [[DA,DB ]]i), each triple indexed by i models
what is at stake in the ith intervention.
– CiA and C
i
B are the cognitive bases of respectively locutors A and B when the i
th intervention
occurs.
– X being one of the locutors A or B, the context CX is managed in two parts: the set of
utterances publicly assumed by X, denoted by EX and a record RX of the linguistic elements
used for building these utterances. All these elements (utterances assumed by locutors and
linguistic elements) are represented by designs. Interactions between these designs enable to
account for their (de)constructions. In this paper, we do not describe the part RX of linguistic
elements and we only focus on the part EX of commitments. Furthermore we do not describe
the correspondence between an utterance, seen as a knowledge, and its logical form. Therefore,
in this paper, an “utterance” is an element of EX .
– Designs DA and DB are the interacting designs representing the surface of the dialogue as
presented in the previous subsection. The result of the interaction at step i is noted [[DA,DB ]]i.
This result is the state of the dialogue after the ith intervention.
We illustrate these elements of modelling with the following dialogue between A and B:
Example 2.
– A: Who wrote to Paul?
– B: Pierre.
We consider three steps in this dialogue: the first one corresponds to the question asked
by A; the second one is the answer given by B. The last one is not expressed explicitly in
this dialogue. Nevertheless, A may consider that the answer given by B is sufficient and ends
properly the dialogue: the dialogue is convergent.
1. The first intervention is produced by A. Interpreting the surface of this dialogue, it is
accounted by a unique dialogue act. This latter is positive according to A, its address is
initial (the dialogue is starting), it creates just a new address on which the answer of this
wh-question is expected. Finally, its phonetical manisfestation is Who wrote to Paul?.
We just account the first part of the cognitive base of A. The set of commitments of A,
denoted by E1A, contains two utterances:
- Someone wrote to Paul. (P1).
- Someone is known by the two locutors A and B; his name is Paul (P2).
2. As soon as B correctly received the intervention of A, the answer given by B is taken
into account by the dialogue act which is positive according to B, which is anchored on
the address created by the previous dialogue act (that B correctly received). It creates
a single address, the one corresponding to the information Pierre wrote to Paul. This
information is expressed by the single word Pierre.
Since B receives correctly the wh-question and answers it, we may consider not only that
the utterances P1 and P2 are available in E2B and may be activated, but also that there
are other propositions in E2B : B knows who wrote to Paul, therefore E2B = {P1, P2, P3, P4}
where P3 corresponds to the utterance Pierre wrote to Paul and P4 corresponds to the
utterance Someone is known by us (A and B), his name is Pierre.
3This notion is very close to the notion of Dialogue Gameboard used by Ginzburg.
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3. The third step is supposed to be expressed implicitly by A, as an acknowledgment of
B’s answer. Therefore, the last dialogue act is produced by A and is the daimon, which
terminates the dialogue on a convergence. Finally, the set of utterances publicly assumed
by A contains after this third step the proposition P3 (the answer given by B) and also the
proposition P4 (the fact that Pierre is known by A and B). Besides these two utterances,
utterances P1 and P2 are also present in E3A.
The formal representation of the dialogue is summed up in the following tables:4
• Dialogue surface (seen from A’s viewpoint):
Steps Dialogue acts of A Dialogue acts of B
1 (+, λ, {wh},Who wrote to Paul)
2 (−, λ, {wh},Who wrote to Paul)
(+, λ.wh, {R}, P ierre)
(−, λ.wh, {R}, P ierre)
3 (z, )
• Contexts (cognitive bases):
Steps CA CB
1 E1A = {P1, P2} E1B = ∅
2 E2A = {P1, P2} E2B = {P1, P2, P3, P4}
3 E3A = {P1, P2, P3, P4} E3B = {P1, P2, P3, P4}
3 More on Divergence
Let us consider some alternative dialogues to the previous one given in example 2.
Example 3.
– A: Who wrote to Paul?
– B: Did Paul receive a letter?
Example 4.
– A: Who wrote to Paul?
– B: Who is Paul?
In both cases, the first step is formalized exactly as previously. After that step, in dialogue 3
as in dialogue 4, the locutor B does not receive as expected this starting intervention. In
dialogue 3, B cannot use the knowledge P1: Someone wrote to Paul for her answer since this
latter is not in her cognitive base. In dialogue 4, proposition P2: The name of someone that
we both know is Paul. is not in EB . In both cases, the reaction of B is to try repairing this
“miscorrespondance of contexts”. Nevertheless the parallel between the two situations stops
here.
• In dialogue 3, the locutor B may receive easily the intervention from A, by using the
design associated to Paul in her cognitive base E2B , and by using elementary syntactical
and semantical abilities. Afterwards, she may extend her context which becomes E2B =
{P1, P2}. The question Did Paul receive a letter?, by means of which B initiates a new
4 is the empty production.
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sub-dialogue, anchored on a new address γ, is mainly the expression that B recorded this
information, new for her. The dialogue may end on a convergence, A answering or not.
Namely we have:
– Contexts in dialogue 3:
Steps CA CB
1 E1A = {P1, P2} E1B = ∅
2 E2A = {P1, P2} E2B = {P1P2}
3 E3A = {P1, P2} E3B = {P1, P2}
– Surface of dialogue 3:
Steps Dialogue acts of A Dialogue acts of B
1 (+, λ, {wh},Who wrote to Paul)
2 (−, λ, {wh},Who wrote to Paul)
(+, γ, {Q}, Did Paul receive a letter?)
(−, γ, {Q}, Did Paul receive a letter?)
3 (z, (yes))
λ.wh `
` λ
z
` γ.Q
γ `
A’s viewpoint
γ.Q ` λ.wh
` λ.wh, γ
λ ` γ
B’s viewpoint
The interaction between the designs
corresponding to the (surface of) dialogue
seen from the viewpoints of respectively A
and B converges.
• In dialogue 4, B cannot receive as expected the intervention from A. In her cognitive
base, B lacks utterances P1 and P2 that are needed and the relative linguistic elements.
Once the intervention is done by A, the base of B is provided with two new utterances:
Someone received a letter, his name is Paul. (P3) and B does not know who is this Paul.
(P4). B has to initiate a new dialogue (anchored on δ) in order to complete her cognitive
base and to share with A informations present in A’s cognitive base.
– Contexts in dialogue 4:
Steps CA CB
1 E1A = {P1, P2} E1B = ∅
2 E2A = {P1, P2} E2B = {P3, P4}
3 E3A = {P1, P2, P4} E3B = {P3, P4}
– Surface of dialogue 4:
Steps Dialogue acts of A Dialogue acts of B
1 (+, λ, {wh},Who wrote to Paul)
2 (−, λ, {wh},Who wrote to Paul)
(+, δ, {wh},Who is Paul ?)
3 (−, δ, {wh},Who is Paul ?)
This situation is different from the two previous ones. An intervention of a locutor
is misunderstood by her addressee. Hence the addressee needs to complete her
cognitive base (knowledges and linguistic elements) in order to be able to continue
the dialogue. If the dialogue stops here, it is divergent.
λ.wh `
` λ
...
` δ.wh
δ `
A’s viewpoint
δ.wh ` λ.wh
` λ.wh, δ
λ ` δ
B’s viewpoint
The interaction between the designs
corresponding to the (surface of) dialogue
seen from the viewpoints of respectively A
and B, does not converge,
if it stops now.
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4 Conclusion
In our theory of dialogues, elements of knowledge and ability are considered individually: a
cognitive base is modelled as a set of designs, each design representing a knowledge or an
ability. Such a cognitive base is the set of facts that are mobilized by each locutor during the
dialogue. It enables to account ruptures, failures and repair attempts occurring in dialogues.
J. Ginzburg [9] makes use of a similar approach, by using context updating as the dialogue
unfolds. We may outline some of the features of our formal framework which are relevant for
such a methodology.
First of all, Ludics provides us with a theoretical frame that integrates interaction as a
primitive and fundamental notion. Note that the same formal process is used for interpreting
all levels of communication. In particular, there are two modes of interaction in Ludics. We
make use of one or the other depending on which property of dialogue has to be considered.
A first aspect of dialogue is modelled as a closed interaction. It integrates the necessity of
keeping communication convergent. This imperative determines the surface of dialogue. A
second aspect of dialogue, modelled as an open interaction, concerns the exchange of datas
between locutors, the record of new informations, the update of other ones. This dimension is
accounted by cognitive bases. In some sense, these two levels provide us with a more or less
fine-grained account of the interaction at work in dialogues. We may either observe the flow of
interaction, or focus on what is interacting (and therefore we fix, step after step, the interacting
supports).
The complementarity of these two levels is illustrated by the analysis of dialogues 3 and 4.
At first sight, these dialogues seem to be formally identical, both ending on a question instead of
an expected answer. However a sharper study, that our modelling enables, reveals differences.
In this analysis, the two levels of our formal framework are important: the model of the surface
of the dialogue enables to remark that one is divergent while the other is convergent, the model
of the cognitive bases enables to explain this difference: commitments sets are not equal.
Finally, it is worth noticing that interaction, as defined in Ludics and as we use it in our
framework, enables to update the cognitive bases, either from one interacting side or from the
other one. Therefore instead of relying on composition, our framework relies on interaction. As
Ludics is a general-purpose logical and computational framework, the same formalization may
be used for dealing with linguistic aspects of utterances as we do for commitments. As a long
term issue, we intend to investigate in which extent this slight shift of viewpoint might renew
semantical and syntactical studies. Even if computational applications are not immediately
expected, a roadmap may be sketched. To start, two questions have to be investigated. The first
one concerns argumentative dialogues, the second one general dialogues. In [7], we succeeded
in characterizing speech acts of argumentation as invariant sequences of dialogue acts. We
have to complete this formalization by providing other invariant sequences of dialogue acts for
argumentative markers, e.g. the ones studied by Winterstein [14]: but, nevertheless, otherwise,
etc. In parallel, we intend to study dialogue ends. In particular, we should study what happens
with respect to knowledge bases (a step towards such an issue is done in this paper). We should
also be able to classify dialogue ends knowing that addresses that are created are closed either
in the following of the dialogue or implicitly with the last interventions. In a next step we
should test our formalization on a corpus of dialogues in order to refine and precise it.
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